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JO EL W. EASTMAN
Entrepreneurship and Obsolence 
Owen W. Davis, Jr . 
and
The Katahdin Charcoal Iron Company
1876-1890
When Owen W. Davis, Jr ., took charge of the Katahdin 
Iron Works in 1876, he was representative of the best of 
the new managerial class which arose in the years 
following the Civil War. Davis was bright, imaginative, and 
aggressive, and yet he was able to maintain excellent 
relations with both labor and stockholders. However, he 
had applied his many talents to an obsolescent industry -  
charcoal iron making -  and, more particularly, to an 
antiquated plant in a remote and underdeveloped section 
of the United States -  northern Maine. Despite some 
remarkable entrepreneurial and technical achievements, 
Davis -  like many other nineteenth century businessmen 
in declining industries -  was bound to fail.
The Katahdin Iron Works had been constructed in 1845 
to produce pig iron from an ore deposit discovered on the 
side of a small mountain in the Maine woods fifty miles 
north of Bangor, the booming lumber capital of the East, 
located at the head of tide on the Penobscot River. The 
iron works, the village built to support it, and the township 
of land which surrounded it had been acquired in 1846 by 
David Pingree of Salem, Massachusetts, a wealthy 
merchant turned timberlands investor, who had accepted 
the property in payment of a debt. The iron works ceased 
operations after ten years, plagued by two major problems 
which Pingree had been unable to solve: the high cost of 
transporting the heavy pig iron by wagon to the port of
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Bangor; and a puzzling smelting problem which produced 
pig iron of widely varying quality and gave the product a 
bad reputation in its main market, Boston, Massachusetts.1
Pingree died in 1863, and after several efforts to 
purchase the iron works and put it back into operation 
failed, it was finally acquired by a group of businessmen 
headed by Thomas N. Egery, a Bangor iron founder, 
which incorporated in 1868 as the Piscataquis Iron Works 
Company.2 Egery and his associates undertook a major 
effort to have a branch railroad line extended to the iron 
works, but when it failed, they apparently decided to 
resume production without it.3 In 1873, the old stone blast 
furnace was put back into operation after a fifteen-year 
lapse, but three years later Egery’s firm determined to 
abandon direct management of the enterprise in favor of 
leasing the property to another company that would run 
the iron manufacturing operation.4
The leader of the new group, Owen W. Davis, Jr., was 
characterized by a local newspaper as “a man of great 
energy and business capacity.”5 Davis was an enthusiastic 
representative of the new managerial class which arose in 
the United States in the years following the Civil War. He 
lacked the financial assets of men like David Pingree and 
Thomas Egery, but he did have a keen eye for economic 
opportunity and the ability to convince others to join him. 
Even though Davis lacked the means to establish a large 
industrial enterprise, he managed those he was given the 
responsibility for with passion and dedication. By early in 
1876 Davis had convinced four other Maine men to join 
him, and they were incorporated as the Katahdin Iron 
Company.
Rather than attempting to purchase the assets of the 
Piscataquis Iron Works Company, Davis and his associates 
leased all the property of Egery’s firm. While stock was 
being sold in the new company and financing for the 
renovation of the plant arranged, Davis traveled around
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the country, visiting all the major iron works. He then 
immersed himself in a study of the latest technology and 
production processes.6
By the time sufficient capital had been obtained, the 
bulk o f it from long-term loans, Davis felt that he was 
prepared to construct and operate a modern, efficient iron 
manufacturing plant. Two turbine water wheels were 
installed to replace the old wooden one. The extra power 
produced was used to operate a huge new blowing 
apparatus which enabled Davis to add ten feet to the 
height of the furnace stack, increasing productive capacity 
almost two and one-half times. A huge bell and hopper 
were installed on the top of the stack to capture waste 
gases which could then be used to heat the air blast, raising 
the efficiency of the furnace. The second water turbine 
powered an elevator that carried the ore, charcoal, and 
limestone flux to the top of the heightened furnace. 
Several new charcoal kilns were built to increase fuel- 
producing capacity to meet the new demands of the 
enlarged furnace. In addition, repairs and improvements 
were made to the iron works village, and an old boarding 
house was rebuilt and renamed a hotel in an effort to 
attract tourists.7
Davis probably had the blast furnace in operation by late 
1876, and he was soon facing the problem with the iron 
sulphide ore which had given David Pingree so much 
difficulty. Davis reported later:
. . . [The] ore was roasted in heaps, on piles of wood, and readily 
yielded most of the combined water, and a large per cent of the 
sulphur, and when fairly well roasted in this manner, it produced, with 
ten per cent of lime and a hot furnace, a very handsome open-grained 
iron, very soft and fluid . . . .  But the action of the furnace was irregular, 
and unsatisfactory: changes and slips being frequent and sudden, all 
the iron above the grade of the soft No. IX . . . showing a lack of 
strength, and an unhealthy fracture not to be expected in a good 
charcoal iron. Occasional analyses of samples of iron sent away for test, 
showed an excessive and unusual amount of silicon, which varied but 
slightly in the different grades from No. 1 to white iron.8
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Davis’ problem was compounded in 1877 when the 
beds of largely oxidized ore on the surface of the deposit 
began to give out. The secondary layer of ore was not as 
fully oxidized as that on the surface, and thus contained 
more sulphur, and in a sulphide form which could not be 
oxidized by the traditional roasting method. When this 
new ore was worked in the blast furnace, the results were 
much more irregular and unsatisfactory than before. 
Davis tried endless experiments with the furnace, 
changing the design of the interior, adding fifteen feet to 
the height of the stack, and increasing the pressure of the 
air blast, all to no avail.9
Undaunted, Davis turned his attention to improving the 
facilities for roasting the ore before it was put into the blast 
furnace. He constructed a series of permanent roasting 
platforms, constructed of stone and iron, which permitted 
more uniform oxidization of the iron sulfide. When the 
ore roasted in this manner was smelted in the remodeled 
blast furnace, the quality of the resultant pig iron was 
improved and fuel consumption decreased.10 Convinced 
that he was on the right track, Davis decided to continue 
his experiments during the winter of 1878:
It seemed apparent, at this time, that the outlook for the iron trade 
was such as to encourage the belief in better times in the ensuing spring, 
and to warrant some further effort at overcoming the difficulty; and it 
was determined to make a thorough investigation into the causes of our 
trouble, in the hope of removing them.
To accomplish this, a chemical laboratory was fitted up at the works, 
and we were fortunate in securing the services of Mr. Ernst Sjostedt, of 
Sweden, a graduate of the school of mines at Stockholm, to conduct the 
investigation.
Complete analyses of ores, iron, fluxes, and cinders from recent and 
former blasts were made, and it very soon became evident that our real 
antagonist had been, not silicon, but sulphur, which met us on every 
hand and in quantities much greater than anticipated. One analysis 
after another confirmed the theory that the relation between sulphur 
and silicon in our pig was very intimate . . . .n
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Davis and Sjostedt theorized that the high heat needed 
in the furnace to make the sulphur combine with the lime 
flux and pass off as slag, also made the silicon unite with 
the iron rather than the flux. The obvious solution was to 
attempt to remove all the sulphur from the ore before it 
was smelted, so that a lower furnace temperature could be 
used which would cause the silicon to pass off in the slag 
rather than combine with the molten iron. Thus, the 
roasting process would have to be still further improved in 
order to heat all of the ore to temperatures required to 
break down the sulphide compound, and, in Davis’ words, 
“do it uniformly, regularly, and on a large scale.”12
The logical next step after experimenting with the 
roasting platforms was to build a large oven or kiln in 
which the ore could be more precisely oxidized. Sjostedt, 
assisted by George D. Colby, the agent at the iron works, 
selected the Westerman kiln, widely used in Sweden, as a 
model, and built a large cylindrical oven of brick, ten feet 
in diameter at the bottom and five at the top, and 
twenty-two feet high which was topped with a thiry-five 
foot chimney four feet in diameter. The kiln was fired by 
wood and the ore dumped into the stack through charging 
doors near the base of the chimney from a trestle similar to 
the one at the blast furnace.13
Tests of the new furnace showed that although the ore 
was uniformly oxidized, some of the sulphur tended to 
settle back on the ore and recombine with it. To overcome 
this problem, a small flue, less than two feet in diameter 
was built in the center of the kiln, extending into the base 
of the chimney. Three rows of openings in this flue were 
designed to draw off the sulphur as soon as it was oxidized 
in order to prevent it from recombining with the ore.14
The center flue proved to be very effective, but several 
more minor procedures were added to the roasting 
process to ensure the effectiveness of the operation. The
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raw ore was sorted to remove any foreign matter and 
broken into small lumps before being shoveled into the 
furnace to insure that it would be uniformly heated. 
Finally, the roasted ore was drawn from the kiln, while 
still hot, directly into a trough of water to remove any 
remaining sulphur.15
Davis reported on the results of the experimentation in 
a paper read at the annual meeting of the United States 
Association of Charcoal Iron Workers, October 20, 1880, 
in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania:
This arrangement is now in use at our works, arid with results entirely 
satisfactory.... [The] resulting pig is of superior quality, of great 
strength, and shows a high chill, and it is selling freely for car wheels to 
some of the largest car wheel shops in the country.,fi
The desulphurized ore not only produced a superior iron, 
but also required less fuel. The furnace was turning out 
fifteen to eighteen tons of pig iron per day using an 
average of only eighty-three bushels of charcoal per ton, 
an accomplishment which the Maine Mining Journal, 
published in Bangor, boasted was “unprecedented in the 
history of charcoal iron-making in this or any other 
country.”17
Interest in the roasting kiln was sufficient for Davis and 
Colby to patent the oven, and smelting experiments were 
continued in spite of the success of the process. Davis 
took the opportunity presented by a fire which halted 
operations for a few weeks in June, 1881, to make a 
number of improvements in machinery and methods 
which resulted in an increase in monthly production from 
500 to 600 tons. The following year, Davis purchased a 
cargo of Spanish iron ore which could be obtained at 
relatively low' cost due to the proximity of the deposits to 
the sea and the number of vessels looking for ret urn cargo 
to the United States, He undertook experiments to see if a 
mixture of the rich, hard Spanish ore and the powdery
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native material would smelt more efficiently, and when the 
tests proved successful, Davis ordered another shipment.18
In 1883, Davis and Colby designed and constructed a 
gas furnace which they felt would heat the roasting kiln 
more uniformly and economically. The specially adapted 
furnace was built to burn worthless charcoal braize, an 
annoying residue which accumulated from the charcoal in 
the coal sheds, and thereby save some 15,000 cords of 
wood annually along with the labor of two or three men. 
The brick furnace was ten feet square at the base, six feet 
at the top, and twenty feet in height. It was fired with a 
blast o f air carried through a pipe from the main works, 
and another funnel carried the gas formed by the burning 
charcoal braize to the roasting kiln where it was used to 
heat the ore.19
Davis also attempted to increase profits by moving into 
the production of iron castings. In the fall of 1882, he 
began taking orders for cast iron railroad car draw bars 
and mining machinery components, and he expressed the 
hope that eventually the entire output of the blast furnace 
could be turned into castings rather than the less 
profitable pigs.20
After the smelting problem had been solved, however, 
the main focus of Davis' attention was placed on the other 
difficulty which had plagued the iron works from the 
beginning -  the high cost of transportation. Although the 
distance over which the iron had to be transported by 
relatively expensive horse and wagon had been reduced 
from fifty to fifteen miles when a railroad was built from 
Bangor to the nearby town of Milo, the hauling fee had 
increased to $4.50 per ton, almost what it had cost to haul 
it the entire distance in 1850.21
Davis concluded that the only way to reduce trans­
portation costs was to extend the railroad to the iron 
works. When the railroad company declined to build a
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branch line, Davis took the initiative and talked Thomas 
Egery into organizing their own railroad. On June 20, 
1881, the Bangor and Katahdin Iron Works Railway was 
formed with a capital stock of a mere $72,000. Davis was 
elected president, and he made clear his determination to 
build the road as expeditiously and economically as 
possible. On June 10, even before the company was 
organized, a civil engineer was surveying the proposed 
route, and on July 29, ground had been broken and the 
contractors had begun work.22
On the same date, the stock in the railroad had been 
oversubscribed, and a prominent banker had offered a 
premium for the first mortgage bonds. One year later, 
before the line was fully completed, the last lot of bonds 
were sold, closing out the entire issue of $100,000, all of 
which sold at par and accrued interest, which the Maine 
Mining Journal called "a fact almost or quite unparalleled 
in the history of a new railroad enterprise.”23
In order to keep costs down, Davis built culverts and 
bridge abutments of wood rather than stone and 
purchased used rails and rolling stock rather than new. 
The rails were laid as far as the village of Brownville, a few 
miles below the iron works, by November, 1881, and 
freight trains began running on that section the following 
week. Construction began again in the spring, and by 
September 15, 1882, trains were running through to the 
iron works.24
The transportation problem had hardly been solved 
when Davis was faced with a financial crisis. The failure of 
a major creditor of the iron works in Portland forced the 
firm into bankruptcy on November 25. A meeting of all 
the major creditors was held four days later and after 
listening to Davis, they voted their confidence in the 
company and his leadership, and agreed to either accept 
twelve cents on the dollar or capitalize the indebtedness. It
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is not clear which alternative was most utilized or what the 
effect was on the control o f the firm, but the crisis was 
quickly surmounted, and the iron works continued to 
operate without interruption.25
Almost a year later, November 13, 1883, Davis was faced 
with another crisis which could not be so easily dealt with. 
A hurricane swept through northern New England, 
inflicting heavy damage in Piscataquis County. It passed 
just south of the iron works, and during the height of the 
storm, debris from the charcoal kilns which had been 
dumped on the river bank was fanned into flames. Sparks 
were carried to the buildings and the iron works burned to 
the ground. A local newspaper reported, “Nothing 
escaped the conflagration except the blacksmith shop and 
storehouse, although a part of the machinery and the tall 
stone furnace stack were saved in a damaged condition.”26 
The Katahdin Iron Company could not avoid failure this 
time since the property was uninsured.
The prospects for rebuilding the iron works did not 
look very promising after the fire since the property was 
uninsured and many charcoal iron furnaces were idle 
because of low iron prices; undaunted, Davis immediately 
began laying plans for the reconstruction of the works 
while making the best o f the situation at hand by 
harvesting the tremendous number of trees that had been 
blown down in the storm. Two new saw mills were built, 
and Davis was soon turning the toppled timber into spool 
and match stock, and box boards. Later in the year, Egery 
built a new shingle and clapboard mill, and soon the 
products of this operation were being added to Davis' 
freight of lumber and also pulp wood leaving on the iron 
works railroad.27
George Colby resigned as agent in February, 1884, and 
left for Port Leyden, New York, to take charge of the 
extensive mines and works of the Geer Iron and Mining 
Company.28 Davis, however, remained and began working
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for the reconstruction of the iron works as soon as his 
temporary lumbering operations were completed. The 
Maine Mining Journal, which had been renamed The 
Industrial Journal, reported that Davis’ plans were based on 
the requests of many of the company’s former customers;
. . . [The] Katahdin iron had established a reputation and a place for 
itself in the market, and the demand for it continued notwithstanding 
the supply had failed. The car wheel and machine shops in New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York and other states which had been 
using the iron, among them some of the largest and best known in the 
country, had come to consider it almost a necessity in their business, 
and strongly urged the rebuilding of the works, as they were loath to 
abandon an article which they had used with such satifactory results. 
Mr. O.W. Davis, Jr., . . . was well satisfied that the iron would meet with 
ready sale at prices ensuring a good margin over the cost of production, 
with suitable facilities for manufacture.29
In May, 1885, Davis secured a new lease from the 
Piscataquis Iron Works Company on more favorable 
terms, giving him control of the mines, timber, and other 
property for fifty years. He then set out to interest the 
businessmen of the Bangor area in forming a new stock 
company to rebuild and operate the iron works on an 
enlarged scale. Although some out-of-date companies 
were reportedly interested in becoming associated with the 
enterprise, Davis argued that control should be kept in 
Bangor. The Industrial Journal, published there, called 
Davis’ offer a simple business proposition. The iron works 
was a proven success, the entire cost of operations could be 
shown, and the margin of profit made apparent. The 
market price, which was at its lowest point since 1878, 
was known to be “at the lowest ebb of its periodic 
fluctuations.”30
The businessmen of Bangor agreed with the Journal's 
optimistic appraisal, and by the end of June the success of 
Davis’ new undertaking was ensured. In July, the work of 
clearing away the fire debris at the iron works began, and 
Davis rehired Ernst Sjostedt, this time to serve as agent.
On July 31, the Katahdin Charcoal Iron Company was 
officially organized in Bangor, and Davis was elected 
general manager. He and the other officers reported that 
the capital of the new concern was sufficient to rebuild the 
works in a substantial manner and that “the fires of the 
furnace are expected to be burning before snow flies.”31
Davis may have been secretly grateful for the 
destruction of the iron works for it gave him an 
opportunity to rebuild almost from scratch, making 
whatever changes and modifications he felt necessary. O f 
course, the stone blast furnace stack, and brick roasting 
kiln had survived with little damage, and the brick 
charcoal kilns were intact. But the rest of the plant was 
almost a total loss, including the dam which had been 
carried away by high water earlier in the year.32
Davis built a new and more substantial dam and a flume 
of heavy masonry to carry the water to the machine house. 
The huge turbine water wheels and auxiliary steam 
engines, which Davis had installed for use in times of low 
water, were saved, repaired, and put back into operation. 
New coal sheds were built along with several new charcoal 
kilns to increase productive capacity. The blast furnace 
was relined and the fire brick core was again extended 
some fifteen feet above the furnace to increase its size. 
Rather than heat the air blast at the top of the heightened 
furnace stack, Davis built a hot blast oven on the ground 
beside it, enabling the air to be piped directly from the 
blast machinery, through the oven, and into the blast 
furnace. A mammoth bell and hopper was placed on the 
top of the stack to collect the hot waste gases and direct 
them through a huge conductor to the hot blast oven on 
the ground. A branch pipe carried some of the gases to a 
new roasting kiln designed to use them as fuel.33
Although the general layout of the new works was 
similar to the old plant, modifications were made so that 
every building was in the most convenient position for
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utmost efficiency of operation. Most of the new structures 
were of frame construction sided with corrugated iron and 
roofed with sheet iron to give excellent protection against 
another fire. A new enlarged casting house was con­
structed and, on the opposite side of the furnace, a 
two-story building through which a double-compart- 
mented elevator shaft extended to the top of the stack. 
On the first floor of this structure the roasted ores and 
fluxes were mixed in the proper proportions for charging 
the furnace, and the second story was connected by a 
platform with coal sheds on the bank behind. Two new 
safety elevators carried the ore, flux, and charcoal to 
the top of the stack where it was fed into the furnace. A 
limestone crusher was installed near the machine house 
and the old de-sulphurizing kiln was used to roast the 
crushed lime rock. By the end of November, the iron 
works was complete, and with its new innovations, 
arrangements and modifications Davis believed he would 
be able to turn out more quality iron at less expense than 
ever before.34
Later in the month representatives of the Bethlehem 
Iron and Steel Works and the Reading Iron Works visited 
the Katahdin Iron Works in order to inspect the new plant 
and especially the new roasting kiln. The visitors were 
impressed by the roasting process and complimented 
Davis on the efficiency of its operation.35
In the early spring of 1886, with the reconstructed plant 
working smoothly and efficiently, and orders for iron 
coming in well ahead of production, Davis left for a trip 
through the West where he made numerous sales of 
iron.36 A year later the United States Navy purchased a 
shipment of Katahdin pig to be used in making cylinders 
for the steam engines of some new cruisers then under 
construction.37 In September, 1887, Davis suggested 
increasing the diameter of the furnace hearth and stack in 
order to further increase the capacity of the furnace, and
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when the major stockholders agreed, the work was 
completed ahead of schedule.38
In November, 1886, Davis had been elected vice- 
president of the National Association of Charcoal Iron 
Workers at their annual meeting in Philadelphia.39 
This was to be the last public recognition Davis would 
receive, and it was a hollow one at that since his furnace 
was one of only about fifty small charcoal furnaces that 
remained of the hundreds which had supplied the bulk of 
American iron before 18 5 5.40 In December, 1888, two 
young Bangor businessmen, Charles D. Stamford and 
Fred W. Hill, purchased a controlling interest in the 
Katahdin Charcoal Iron Company and took an active role 
in the management of the firm, shunting Davis aside. 
Although Stamford and Hill appear to have been 
optimistic about the future of the iron works initially, and 
the demand for the Katahdin pig iron remained good, the 
new managers must have soon come to the conclusion that 
a charcoal iron furnace could not be made profitable, no 
matter how modern and efficient it was.41 On March 21, 
1890, the Industrial Journal reprinted without comment 
this cryptic epitaph for the iron works from the Piscataquis 
Observer:
Work will be suspended at the Katahdin Iron Works in a week or two, 
the kilns having been filled for the last time. No wood has been cut this 
year. There are various opinions as to the ore supply, but it is a fact that 
it costs more to get it than the prices received for it warrant. Various 
parties have at different times attempted to operate these works but 
none of them have ever made any considerable amount of money, and 
several have sunk a good deal.42
Owen W. Davis, Jr ., had accomplished some remarkable 
things while managing the Katahdin Iron Works. He had 
solved a complex smelting problem, built a railroad to 
reduce transportation costs, introduced innumerable 
improvements in plant and procedure, and, perhaps most 
remarkable, successfully organized a second iron company
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after the first had twice failed. Ironically, the name of that 
second firm contained its own epitaph -  charcoal -  for 
charcoal iron furnaces were obsolescent. Owen Davis, 
despite his remarkable achievements, was bound to fail.
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